In encryption, when Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) is used, the Initialization Vector (IV) must be random and unpredictable. Otherwise, the encrypted value is vulnerable to crypto-analysis attacks such as the "Chosen-Plaintext Attack".
An IV value should be associated to one, and only one encryption cycle, because the IV's purpose is to ensure that the same plaintext encrypted twice will yield two different ciphertexts.
To that end, IV's should be:
This rule raises an issue when the IV is hard-coded.
For PyCryptodome module:
from Crypto.Cipher import AES from Crypto.Random import get_random_bytes from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad, unpad static_vector = b'x' * AES.block_size cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, static_vector) cipher.encrypt(pad(data, AES.block_size)) # Noncompliant
For cryptography module:
from os import urandom from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes static_vector = b'x' * 16 cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(key), modes.CBC(static_vector)) cipher.encryptor() # Noncompliant
For PyCryptodome module:
from Crypto.Cipher import AES from Crypto.Random import get_random_bytes from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad, unpad random_vector = get_random_bytes(AES.block_size) cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, random_vector) cipher.encrypt(pad(data, AES.block_size))
For cryptography module:
from os import urandom from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes random_vector = urandom(16) cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(key), modes.CBC(random_vector)) cipher.encryptor()